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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate reputation, understood as the “perceptions of how the firm behaves towards its 
stakeholders and the degree of informative transparency with which the firm develops 
relations with them” (de la Fuente and de Quevedo, 2003, p.280), is increasingly gaining 
attention from companies (Brammer and Pavelin, 2004). This tendency is justified by the 
characteristics of the current competitive markets, just as explained by the corporate 
marketing perspective (Balmer, 1998; Balmer and Greyser, 2003). The essential idea brought 
to literature by corporate marketing can be summarised as one that gives a special 
significance to the institutional level of organizations. It is believed that institutional 
intangible attributes of organizations are more durable and resistant to competitive pressures 
than product and service attributes, which tend to be highly standardized in most industries 
(Illia and Balmer, 2012). Intangible assets may serve companies better in the search for 
competitive advantages because they are hard to duplicate or imitate by competitors (Surroca 
et al., 2010). Gómez-Mejía and Balkin (2002) state that, among intangible corporate assets, 
corporate reputation is the most relevant, a fact which has aroused a growing interest in the 
research and management of this concept. In current markets, creating, refining, or even 
repairing corporate reputation with stakeholders is essential to success (Ellen et al., 2006). 
Castelo and Lima (2006) explain how reputational assets, although not legally protected by 
property rights, are considered to be path dependent assets characterized by high levels of 
specificity and social complexity, thus creating a strong resource position barrier.  
 
In their search for new paths to explain reputation, scholars have recently focused their 
attention on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting to stakeholders (Piechocki, 
2004; de los Ríos et al., 2012; Craig and Brennan, 2012). The CSR reporting to stakeholders 
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is defined as the provision to diverse stakeholders of “financial and non-financial information 
relating to an organization’s interaction with its physical and social environment, as stated in 
corporate annual reports or separate social reports” (Hackston and Milne, 1996, p.78). This 
reporting includes details of the physical environment, energy, human resources, products and 
community involvement matters. Scholars have considered the CSR reporting to stakeholders 
as a value-added tool (Cormier and Magnan, 2003) which not only signals a company’s 
transparency but is also increasingly seen as a means of enhancing corporate reputation 
(Othman et al., 2011). According to the institutional/legitimacy theory, many scholars 
consider that the reporting of financial, social and environmental information is part of the 
dialogue between a company and its stakeholders, it provides information on a company’s 
activities that help legitimizing its behaviour and it is thus closely related to reputation 
management (Bebbington et al., 2008; Michelon, 2011; Othman et al., 2011). For example, 
CSR information disclosed in voluntary CSR and sustainability reports reflects the CSR 
activities that a company has recently performed. These CSR activities signal that the 
company is a good corporate citizen, especially if the fact that the CSR reporting to 
stakeholders is not compulsory for companies is taken into account. In other words, the 
reporting justifies the continued existence of the company, which contributes to its reputation 
(Othman et al., 2011). Based on these ideas, it is also considered that CSR and sustainability 
reports serve to facilitate the projection of a socially accountable image which allows the 
company to manage reputational risks (Fombrun et al., 2000; Bebbington et al., 2008; 
Unerman, 2008). Consequently, there has been a fast growth in the number of CSR reports 
published in recent years, both at the international level and in the Spanish context, where the 
present research is implemented (Adams et al., 1998; Cormier and Magnan, 2003). 
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Scholars have also considered that a critical issue in analysing corporate reputation for CSR 
(CSRR) is the industry level effect (Melo and Garrido, 2012). It has been demonstrated that 
industries are subject to specific and localized pressures from different stakeholders and that 
industry acts as a mediating player between reputation and CSR (Brammer and Pavelin, 
2006). Thus, it is well-known that the CSR reporting is not homogeneous among industries 
(Adams et al., 1998; Holder-Webb et al., 2009; Saleh et al., 2010; Gamerschlag et al., 2011). 
For example, banks “do not produce hazardous chemicals or discharge toxic pollutants into 
the air, land or water” (Thompson and Cowton, 2004, p.199) and as so they usually disclose 
little environmental information in their CSR and sustainability reports (Gamerschlag et al., 
2011). On the contrary, companies from polluting sectors (such as the automobile, basic 
resources, chemical, construction or transportation/logistics industries) provide more 
information on environmental issues. These companies have a long tradition in CSR 
reporting, as they have been confronted with powerful stakeholders from the environmental 
movement since the early 1980s (Gamerschlag et al., 2011). Accordingly, they proactively 
disclose much information on their environmental performance to reduce the possible 
political costs arising from their despised activities (Meek et al., 1995; Deegan and Gordon, 
1996). 
 
Nonetheless, and in spite of all the theoretical support for the relationship between the 
reporting to stakeholders and CSRR, scholars have recognized that there is still little empirical 
evidence concerning how the information contained in the CSR reporting influences the 
processes by which reputation is built or destroyed. New research is specifically needed 
regarding how communication links to CSRR in different industries (Soppe et al., 2011; 
Bayoud and Kavanagh, 2012). Based on the previous ideas, the authors of this paper propose 
that industry effects influence the CSR reporting and its relationship with CSRR, in such a 
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way that significant differences exist in the amount of CSR reporting provided by companies 
(intensity of the CSR reporting), the kinds of CSR information reported in CSR and 
sustainability reports (orientation of the CSR reporting) and the effect of the CSR reporting on 
CSRR. To test these ideas, the authors resort to the 2013 ‘MercoEmpresas Responsables’ 
index to evaluate the CSRR of the most reputed companies in Spain. The CSR reporting is 
measured by means of a content analysis of the 2011 CSR and sustainability reports of these 
companies. Univarate empirical analyses are performed to identify differences in the intensity 
and orientation of the CSR reporting across four industries: basic, consumer goods, finance 
and services industries. Also, multivariate empirical analyses are performed to understand the 
influence of the global CSR reporting and specific CSR reporting domains (taken as 
independent variables) on CSRR (the dependent variable in the analyses) in each of the 
industries. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the second and third 
sections, a theoretical overview of the relationship between the CSR reporting and CSRR is 
discussed and three research hypotheses are presented. The authors also describe the method 
applied to the study; they outline the results of the paper and, finally, the most relevant 
conclusions, limitations and future lines of research are discussed. 
 
2. CSR REPORTING TO STAKEHOLDERS AND REPUTATION 
 
Although several theories have traditionally linked the CSR reporting to corporate reputationi, 
the approach most extensively accepted to understand the connection is provided by the 
institutional/legitimacy theory (Patten, 1992; Deegan, 2002). This theory is frequently used to 
understand the voluntary adoption of the CSR reporting and CSR reporting standards by 
companies (Nikolaeva and Bicho, 2011; Michelon, 2011). From this perspective, scholars 
look at the CSR reporting as a legitimacy and reputation management tool responding to 
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pressures by stakeholders and driven by corporate identity communications (Rodríguez et al., 
2013). Scholars consider that there exists a considerable overlap between legitimacy and 
reputation in the sense that a company cannot have good reputation without gaining the 
approval of its stakeholders by means of corporate communications and reporting (King and 
Whetten, 2008). Thus, achieving legitimacy is essential for companies and is a prerequisite 
for reputation management. Legitimacy and reputation are even used interchangeably in some 
accounting as well as in social accounting papers (Deegan, 2002).  
 
Scholars consider that firm legitimation is “a process that translates past performance into an 
expectation for the future” (de Quevedo et al., 2007, p.60). Thus legitimation transforms CSR, 
an objective flow variable, into corporate reputation, a perceptual stock variable. Scholars 
aligning with this stream of research consider that homogeneous CSR investments and 
communications in successive periods and in changing institutional contexts consolidate 
reputation because stakeholders translate the company’s past performance into expectations 
concerning future performance. Along this line, King and Whetten (2008) believe that the link 
that provides common ground for the treatment of legitimacy and reputation as 
complementary concepts is the notion of corporate identity, which is commonly reflected in 
CSR and sustainability reports (Pérez and Rodríguez del Bosque, 2012). This perspective is 
explained by the ideas of the signalling theory (Toms, 2002), which argues that companies 
engage in CSR reporting as a way to signal their reputation to stakeholders (Michelon, 2011).  
 
Based on the proposals of this institutional/legitimacy theory, the latest contributions to the 
academic literature in the CSR reporting field have understood the industry level effect as a 
determinant of the CSR reporting to stakeholders (Adams et al., 1998; Newson and Deegan, 
2002; Ghazali, 2007; Holder-Webb et al., 2009; Gamerschlag et al., 2011). Specifically, the 
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industry in which the company is primarily identified is believed to influence the intensity 
(Hackston and Milne, 1996; Reverte, 2009; Gamerschlag et al., 2011) and orientation of the 
CSR reporting (Newson and Deegan, 2002; Ghazali, 2007; Holder-Webb et al., 2009) because 
the stakeholder pressures differ significantly from some industries to others (Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2006). In this paper the authors have already highlighted the differences in the 
demands of stakeholders for companies to report their environmental impact when they 
operate in a polluting (chemical) vs. a non-polluting (banking) industry (Gamerschlag et al., 
2011). Based on these ideas, the authors propose that the institutional/legitimacy theory also 
provides the foundations to expect significant differences on the influence of CSR reporting 
to stakeholders on CSRR in different industries (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Patten, 1991). 
Nonetheless, this idea has not been empirically explored in previous research and this fact 
contributes to the originality of the present paper.  
 
3. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1. Industry and the intensity of the CSR reporting to stakeholders 
 
Scholars have demonstrated that industry membership affects the amount of the CSR 
reporting provided by companies (Gamershlag et al., 2011). For example, the most significant 
differences in the amount of CSR information that companies include in their CSR and 
sustainability reports exist between high- and low-profile industries (Patten, 1991; Hackston 
and Milne, 1996). As opposed to low-profile industries, high-profile industries are those with 
consumer visibility, a high level of political risk, or concentrated intense competition 
(Roberts, 1992). Although classifications are to an extent subjective and ad hoc, most scholars 
identify petroleum, chemical, and forest and paper as high-profile industries (Reverte, 2009). 
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These are all basic industries according to the National Classification on Economic Activities 
available in Spain (INE, 2013). High-profile companies have greater incentive to project 
positive CSR identities through the CSR reporting to stakeholders (Newson and Deegan, 
2002) and as so they report significantly more CSR information than low-profile companies 
(Hackston and Milne, 1996) because the latter do not suffer from high stakeholder pressures 
to behave ethically and in accordance to CSR principles (Ghazali, 2007). These ideas are 
closely related to the institutional/legitimacy theory, which according to Reverte (2009) is the 
most relevant theory for explaining the CSR reporting practices of Spanish companies.  
 
Contrary to previous classifications in international contexts (Day and Woodward, 2009), in 
this paper the authors consider that the finance industry can also be considered a high-profile 
industry in Spain. In this regard, a new stream of research related to the 
institutional/legitimacy theory examines the role that media coverage plays in increasing the 
public policy pressures faced by companies (Patten, 2002). The total amount of media 
coverage raises corporate visibility, inviting further public attention and scrutiny (Greening 
and Gray, 1994). Similarly, the media play a role in conforming or eroding the legitimacy of 
companies: the media can influence corporate reputation and in doing so exert pressure for 
companies to report more intensively on their CSR activities (Cormier and Magnan, 2003). 
Along this line, the Spanish finance industry has recently attracted great media coverage 
because of the economic recession that has especially threated this industry. This 
circumstance generates new forms of coercive pressures in exchange for continued legitimacy 
and can take finance companies to increase their intensity of CSR reporting to stakeholders 
(Ghazali, 2007). Based on these ideas, the first research hypothesis of the paper is proposed: 
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H1: The intensity of the CSR reporting varies across industries. Companies in basic and 
finance industries report significantly more CSR information than companies in other 
industries. 
 
3.2. Industry and the orientation of the CSR reporting to stakeholders 
 
The kinds of information included in the CSR reporting are also influenced by industry 
(Adams et al., 1998). In this regard, the institutional/legitimacy theory supports the idea that 
companies are rewarded for developing the CSR reporting “isomorphic” with external 
institutional pressures (Greening and Gray, 1994). The CSR reporting in companies with 
highly institutional environments is shaped by responses to formal pressures from other 
organizations (coercive isomorphism), by imitation of structures adopted by others in 
response to the pressures (mimetic isomorphism), or by conformity to normative standards 
established by external institutions (normative isomorphism) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Thus, companies facing the same institutional environment provided by their industry will 
have similar CSR reporting structures, which will significantly differ from the CSR reporting 
in other industries (Greening and Gray, 1994) because what becomes legitimate in one 
industry is not legitimate in another one (Beliveau et al., 1994).  
 
For example, it has been demonstrated that companies from industries whose manufacturing 
process has a negative influence on the environment, such as basic industries, disclose and 
report considerably more environmental and social information than companies from other 
industries (Dierkes and Preston, 1977; Reverte, 2009). On the contrary, the tertiary industry is 
where most job creation occurs and is the home of mass franchising. It is also the most labour 
intensive. Accordingly, companies in tertiary industries can be expected to exhibit greater 
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concern with demonstrating their social responsibility to employees since this is likely to 
enhance corporate image and influence sales (Jones, 1999). Finally, companies in the 
consumer goods industry are the largest and most capital intensive in the economy, and as so 
they also tend to interface with the most extensive array of stakeholder groups to whom they 
have to report their CSR activities (Jones, 1999). Based on these ideas, the second research 
hypothesis of the paper is proposed: 
 
H2: The orientation of the CSR reporting varies across industries: 
H2a: Companies in basic industries report significantly more CSR information to 
the community (including the environment) than other industries. 
H2b: Companies in consumer goods industries report significantly more CSR 
information to customers, investors, partners, regulators, activists and the media 
than other industries. 
H2c: Companies in finance and services industries report significantly more CSR 
information to employees than other industries. 
 
3.3. Industry effects in the relationship between the intensity and orientation of  the CSR 
reporting to stakeholders and reputation 
 
Finally, the industry in which companies operate determines the way in which the intensity 
and orientation of the CSR reporting to stakeholders influence CSRR. Fist, aligning with the 
ideas of the visibility approach to the institutional/legitimacy theory, it is believed that in 
those industries where corporate visibility and media exposure are higher the CSR reporting 
would be more relevant and companies would report more information (Brammer and 
Millington, 2005). This reporting would influence CSRR to a larger extent. Along this line, 
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Craig and Brennan (2002) demonstrate that visibility has a positive influence on the extent to 
which corporate reputation is associated with the CSR reporting. 
 
Similarly, the political cost theory is based on the premise that companies do have political 
visibility and an incentive to use accounting methods and the CSR reporting to influence their 
political visibility and reduce public pressures (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Ghazali, 2007). 
Aligning with this perspective, Patten (1991) argues that industry influences political 
visibility and this drives the CSR reporting to ward off undue pressure and criticism from 
social activists. It is believed that because of the industry in which they operate, companies 
have to deal with either more or less powerful stakeholders and thus face different levels of 
political and societal costs (Verrecchia, 1983; Gamerschlag et al., 2011). Following this line 
of argument, companies in certain types of industries may also face different degrees of 
pressure to report certain types of information because of competitive reasons. In this regard, 
scholars consider that companies with more extensive reporting in some industries do so to 
manage their exposure to future regulatory costs that might be detrimental to their corporate 
reputation (Blacconiere and Patten, 1994; Patten and Nance, 1998). For example, companies 
in some industries are expected to be subject to significantly less stakeholder pressures 
regarding their environmental or social performance and as so, it could be expected that the 
CSR reporting on those issues which are not that relevant for them would not impact CSRR as 
much as in those industries where environmental or social pressures are higher (Reverte, 
2009).  
 
The authors of this paper consider that, if diverse stakeholders have different expectations of 
companies depending on the industry where they are located, not only the information 
provided by companies in their CSR reporting to stakeholders may be different but also the 
 12 
effect of the CSR reporting and its dimensions on CSRR may differ. Based on this idea, the 
third research hypothesis of the paper is proposed: 
 
H3: The interaction between the industry and the CSR reporting influences significantly 
the relationship between the (a) intensity and (b) orientation of the CSR reporting and 
CSRR.  
 
4. METHOD 
 
The sample in the study is compounded of companies included in the ‘MercoEmpresas 
Responsables’ index. This index is constructed in a similar way to other international and 
reputed CSR rankings (e.g., RepTrak model), so the results in this study can be easily 
compared to previous findings in literature (Othman et al., 2011). Merco ranks Spanish 
companies according to their global reputation after they are evaluated by more than 1,500 
senior business executives, financial analysts, NGOs, unions, consumer associations and 
opinion leaders. The questionnaire includes three items related to CSR and corporate ethics, 
which are used to build the ‘MercoEmpresas Responsables’ index. These items are: (1) 
Ethical Corporate Behaviour; (2) Community Commitment and (3) Social and Environmental 
Responsibility. In 2013, Merco has ranked the best 100 Spanish companies based on their 
CSR performance. However, for the purpose of this study 16 companies are deleted because 
they do not regularly publish CSR or sustainability reports. Similar to Melo and Garrido 
(2012), companies are assigned to one of the following industries: 1) basic, 2) consumer 
goods, 3) finance or 4) services industryii. The profile of the industries analysed in this study 
is presented in Table 1.  
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Insert Table 1 here. 
 
To measure the CSR reporting to stakeholders, a content analysis of 2011 CSR and 
sustainability reports is applied (Gamerschlag et al., 2011; de los Ríos et al., 2012). Fombrun 
et al.’s (2000) categorization of stakeholders is used to define eight dimensions of the CSR 
reporting of the companies in the ‘MercoEmpresas Responsables’ index: (1) employees, (2) 
customers, (3) investors, (4) community, (5) regulators, (6) partners, (7) activists and (8) 
media. The items in each dimension are taken from previous papers which have attempted to 
measure CSR activities in different industries (Clarkson, 1995; Maignan and Ferrell, 2004; 
Brammer and Pavelin, 2004, 2006; Bird et al., 2007; Turker, 2009; Mishra and Suar, 2010; 
Alon et al., 2010; Soppe et al., 2011; Michelon, 2011; Melo and Garrido, 2012; de los Ríos et 
al., 2012; Michelon et al., 2013). Each item is evaluated depending on whether the company 
works on it (1) or not (0). The item valuation responds to the sentence “This company informs 
about significant initiatives implemented (or results achieved) in this CSR domain”. The final 
score of a company in a CSR reporting dimension is the weighted average of the evaluations 
it gets in each of the items forming the dimension. The authors also calculate the global CSR 
reporting score of each company. This variable represents the addition of scores that each 
company gets in all their CSR reporting dimensionsiii. Each report is reviewed by two judges 
independently and the inter-judged agreement coefficient, calculated according to Perrault and 
Leigh (1989)iv, reports a 99.6% level of accordance in the evaluation, which is noticeable 
above the minimum recommended value of 90%. Additional information regarding the CSR 
reporting to stakeholders and the items that comprise each dimension is shown in the 
appendix. 
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To test the hypotheses H1 and H2, first several univariate analyses are performed which allow 
the authors to determine the intensity and orientation of the CSR reporting in each industry. 
Also several F-statistics (ANOVA) are calculated to analyse if significant differences exist 
among industries concerning both the intensity and orientation of their CSR reporting. To test 
the hypothesis H3, a multivariate analysis is performed. Two regression analyses are 
implemented where CSRR is the dependent variable. The estimations are made by applying 
ordinary least squares (OLS) through the robust estimator. This estimator uses the White 
correction in order to control the problems of heterocedasticity that usually appear in these 
types of cross-section analyses. The first model (1) includes a global CSR reporting measure 
as the independent factor that helps explaining CSRR scores. Nevertheless and as it has been 
discussed in the theoretical section, the effect that the CSR reporting can have on CSRR 
scores varies according to industry. Thus, the authors are faced with some differentiated 
situations that need to be considered. As a result, the sample is divided into four groups, 
according to each industry in the analyses (Basic industries, Consumer goods, Finance and 
Services).This fact is shown in model 1). 
 
CSRRi = β0 +(β1 + β2 Consumer goods + β3 Finance + β4 Services)CSR reportingi + 
β5Agei + β6Sizei + β7ROAi + β8Riski + εit 
(1) 
 
To carry out the empirical test, the CSR reporting variable is included in the model 
specification together with three interaction variables (controlling for the four industries of the 
sample). The incorporation of these variables into the model enables the authors to obtain 
evidence of the hypothesis H3, as the four groups of companies are thus clearly differentiated. 
In order to test the hypothesis, the coefficients of the model and the interaction variables must 
be interpreted. For those companies that are in the Basic industries sector, the null hypothesis 
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H0: β1=0 needs to be tested. If this null hypothesis is rejected, then the coefficient β1 is 
statistically different from zero, and it measures the sensitivity of a company’s CSRR to the 
CSR reporting for companies that belong to this industry. In order to correctly interpret the 
interaction variables, it is necessary to perform a linear restriction test. So, the authors test the 
null hypothesis H0: β1+β2=0 for the Consumer goods industry, H0: β1+β3=0 for the Finance 
industry and H0: β1+β4=0 for the Services industry. If these null hypotheses are rejected, the 
sums of coefficients are statistically different from zero, and they capture the estimation of the 
sensitivity of CSRR to the CSR reporting for each industry.  
 
The second model (2) includes all the dimensions of the CSR reporting to stakeholders as 
independent variables, interacting with the industry dummy variables. In order to correctly 
interpret the interaction variables, it is necessary to perform linear restriction tests, as it has 
been commented in the interpretation of model (1). 
 
CSRRi = β0 + (β1 + β2 Consumer goods + β3 Finance + β4 Services)Employeesi +  
(β5 + β6 Consumer goods + β7 Finance + β8 Services)Customersi + 
(β9 + β10 Consumer goods + β11 Finance + β12 Services)Investorsi +  
(β13 + β14 Consumer goods + β15 Finance + β16 Services)Partnersi +  
(β17 + β18 Consumer goods + β19 Finance + β20 Services)Communityi + 
(β21 + β22 Consumer goods + β23 Finance + β24 Services)Regulatorsi + 
(β25 + β26 Consumer goods + β27 Finance + β28 Services)Activistsi + 
(β29 + β30 Consumer goods + β31 Finance + β32 Services)Mediai + 
Β33 Agei +β34 Sizei + β35 ROAi + β36 Riski + εit 
(2) 
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As it is shown in equations (1) and (2), control variables are also included in the analyses to 
reduce bias in the results. First, the authors control for company age. Companies are divided 
in two categories depending on this variable: 1) ‘young’ if they are 10 years old or younger 
and 2) ‘consolidated’ if they are older than 10. Corporate size, measured as the log of the 
number of employees, is also controlled (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Gamerschlag et al., 
2011). Size is a relevant variable because it may be related to the urgency and salience of 
stakeholder relations (Hillman and Keim, 2001) and scholars have suggested that it is a 
variable that affects both corporate reputation and the CSR reporting to stakeholders 
(Gamerschlag et al., 2011). Basically, larger firms are expected to receive more publicity and 
to have greater name recognition (Turban and Greening, 1997). The third control variable is 
financial performance, measured by the ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets (ROA) (Turban 
and Greening, 1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Brammer and Millington, 2005; Melo and 
Garrido, 2012). Strong financial performance generally signals an effective corporate strategy 
and resource allocations, and as so helps a firm establish a good reputation, particularly 
among groups of financial stakeholders such as creditors, investors, and external analysts 
(Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). It has also been investigated 
under the light of CSR and several authors have found a recursive relationship between CSR 
and financial performance (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001). Finally, 
the debt ratio of companies is used to control for corporate risk.  
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5. FINDINGS 
 
5.1. Univariate empirical analyses 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the basic univariate statistics for the CSRR and intensity of the CSR 
reporting to stakeholders.. First, it is observed that no significant differences exist in the 
CSRR of the basic, consumer goods, finance and services industries (F=0.88, p>0.1) although 
significant differences do exist in the intensity of their CSR reporting to stakeholders (F=5.48, 
p<0.01). Specifically, companies in the finance (Mean=0.53) and basic industries 
(Mean=0.48) report significantly more CSR information to stakeholders than companies in 
the consumer goods (Mean=0.38) and services industries (Mean=0.39). Nonetheless, no 
significant differences are observed between the intensity of reporting of companies in the 
consumer goods and services industries (dif.=|0.09|, p>0.1) and finance and basic industries 
(dif.=|0.43|, p>0.1). Because it was expected that companies in basic and finance industries 
would report significantly more CSR information to stakeholders than any other kind of 
companies, the hypothesis H1 is supported.  
 
Insert Table 2 here. 
 
Insert Table 3 here. 
 
Figure 1 presents the statistics for the orientation of the CSR reporting to stakeholders in each 
industry. The results show that in all the industries companies report the largest amount of 
information to activists (0.20<Mean<0.23), employees (0.18<Mean<0.20) and the community 
(0.16<Mean<0.19). In this regard, most companies in all the industries implement volunteer 
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activities, coordinate CSR activities with nongovernmental and community organizations, 
participate in environmental protection activities and take care of employees’ concerns such 
as diversity, training, development, equal opportunities or health issues. On the contrary, the 
lowest amount of information is provided to investors (0.01<Mean<0.08) and partners such as 
providers and distributors (0.04<Mean<0.09). These types of information refer to economic 
features already included in financial reports or information on activities implemented by 
companies to ensure that providers and distributors align with their CSR principles and 
objectives. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
 
When comparing the dimensions of the CSR reporting to stakeholders among industries 
(Table 4), it is first observed that no significant differences exist in the amount of CSR 
information reported to the community (F=1.68, p>0.1), and as so the hypothesis H2a is not 
supported. Furthermore, no significant differences exist among industries in the CSR 
reporting to customers (F=1.28, p>0.1), partners (F=0.48, p>0.1) and activists (F=2.05, 
p>0.1). Significant differences are observed in the CSR reporting to investors (F=0.71, 
p>0.01), regulators (F=3.07, p<0.05) and the media (F=3.55, p<0.05). However, the findings 
are contrary to the expectations of the authors. Companies in the consumer goods industry 
always report less information in these dimensions than companies in the basic and finance 
industries. Based on these results, the hypothesis H2b is not supported. Finally, significant 
differences are observed among industries in their CSR reporting to employees (F=4.00, 
p>0.01). Specifically, finance companies report significantly more information to employees 
than companies in the basic (dif.=|0.12|, p<0.1), consumer goods (dif.=|0.16|, p<0.1) and 
services industries (dif.=|0.22|, p<0.01). The authors expected that, along with the finance 
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industry, companies in services industries would also report significantly more information to 
their employees than the rest of industries. Nonetheless, it is observed that services companies 
report the lowest amount of information to their employees (Mean=0.57), and as so the 
hypothesis H2c is supported only partially.  
 
Insert Table 4 here. 
 
5.2. Multivariate empirical analyses 
 
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the two regressions implemented to test hypothesis H3. 
First, it is observed that the intensity of the CSR reporting to stakeholders positively 
influences CSRR in the finance industry (β=0.07, p<0.05). However, the intensity of the CSR 
reporting to stakeholders does not significantly affect CSRR in the basic (β=0.05, p>0.1), 
consumer goods (β=0.02, p>0.1) or services (β=0.02, p>0.1) industries. When analysing the 
role of the dimensions of the CSR reporting to stakeholders on CSRR, the results show that in 
basic industries only the CSR reporting to partners positively influences CSRR (β=0.83, 
p<0.05). In consumer goods industries only the CSR reporting to customers is relevant to 
CSRR and it affects it negatively (β=-0.43, p<0.1). In services industries, CSRR is positively 
influenced by the CSR reporting to employees (β=0.94, p<0.1) but negatively affected by the 
CSR reporting to regulators (β=-0.82, p<0.01). Finally, up to four kinds of reporting to 
stakeholders influence CSRR in the finance industry. In this industry, CSRR is positively 
affected by the CSR reporting to investors (β=0.58, p<0.01) and activists (β=0.58, p<0.01) 
although it is negatively influenced by the CSR reporting to customers (β=-1.04, p<0.05) and 
the media (β=-0.78, p<0.1). Based on all these results, the hypothesis H3 is accepted because 
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the influence of the (a) intensity and (b) orientation of the CSR reporting to stakeholders on 
CSRR varies across industries.  
 
Regarding the control variables in the study, it is observed that the CSRR scores significantly 
vary according to corporate size in the specifications I (β=0.05, p<0.05) and II (β=0.07, 
p<0.01). CSRR is also significantly influenced by corporate risk in the specification I 
(β=.0.39, p<0.05). Corporate age and financial performance are insignificant when explaining 
how the CSRR is built in different industries.  
 
Insert Table 5 here. 
 
Insert Table 6 here. 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 
Most of the results of this paper are somehow consistent with previous findings in the 
academic literature, demonstrating that the CSR reporting of companies in Spain is in 
accordance with the international CSR reporting trends (KPMG, 2011). For example, 
companies in all the industries mostly communicate about human resources, community and 
environmental issues (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Newson and Deegan, 2002; Ghazali, 2007; 
Holder-Webb et al., 2009; Saleh et al., 2010). It is also demonstrated that companies in basic 
industries report significantly more CSR information to stakeholders than companies in most 
of the other industries because of the strong social pressures derived from their visibility, 
political risk and intense competition (Gamerschlag et al., 2011). Both basic and finance 
industries report more information in almost all the CSR reporting dimensions considered in 
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this paper (only equated by finance companies). On the contrary, companies in consumer 
goods and services industries report significantly less CSR information because of their lower 
environmental and social impact (Adams et al., 1998; Gamerschlag et al., 2011). Finally, 
finance companies, which are very labour intensive, report significantly more CSR 
information to employees than companies in the rest of industries (Melo and Garrido, 2012).  
 
Nonetheless, some distinctive features are also observed regarding the kinds of information 
reported to specific stakeholders by Spanish companies in different industries. For example, it 
is observed that, contrary to the results of previous research, basic industries do not 
significantly report more environmental and community information than other industries 
(Reverte, 2009). The authors justify this result by resorting to the increasing pressures 
suffered by almost all kinds of companies to incorporate social and environmental 
considerations in their business activities. For example, retailers are actually frequently 
criticized by various stakeholders because of their increasing economic weight and the 
importance of the externalities generated by their activities on society and the environment 
(Mejri and de Wolf, 2012). Also the lending decisions of finance companies have an impact 
on the natural environment (Day and Woodward, 2009) and this fact justifies the large 
amount of information reported to the community in this industry. Furthermore, although 
consumer goods industries were expected to report significantly more than other industries in 
most of the CSR reporting dimensions (because of the large number of stakeholders that they 
have to satisfy), it has been demonstrated that this hypothesis does not hold true in the 
Spanish context. Once again, this result can be justified by taking a look at the rising 
pressures that stakeholders put on companies to embrace a holistic planning of their CSR 
initiatives. 
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The results which contradict the expectations of the authors are mostly justified by the CSR 
reporting of finance companies. In this regard, the results of the paper demonstrate that the 
CSR reporting to stakeholders is an especially relevant management tool in the Spanish 
finance industry. Contrary to previous findings in other countries (e.g., Day and Woodward, 
2009), not only finance companies report significantly more CSR information than most 
industries in the country but also this reporting is more closely linked to their CSRR than the 
CSR reporting of basic, consumer goods and services industries. These results are in 
accordance with the institutional/legitimacy and political cost theories. In this regard, 
although scholars have not traditionally considered the finance industry as a high-profile 
sector, recent events in Spain demonstrate that finance companies have most of the 
characteristics identified in high-profile industries across countries (Roberts, 1992). For 
example, the finance industry is currently facing a serious trust crisis closely related to the 
economic recession in Spain. Scholars consider that crises create a form of institutional 
pressure which reflects societal ills, poses threats to organizational and governmental 
legitimacy and generates institutional pressures from stakeholders (Greening and Gray, 1994). 
Thus, the crisis has taken the finance industry to be highly visible and political costs have 
significantly risen in this context. These circumstances generate demands for accountability 
that translate into new forms of coercive pressure in exchange for continued legitimacy 
(Ghazali, 2007). In summary, then, crises may indicate higher institutional pressures and 
clearly influence stakeholders’ perceptions of corporate reputation. This fact takes finance 
companies to report significantly more than any other industry in the country, this CSR 
reporting being highly relevant to maintain their reputation. 
 
Finally, it is noticeable that the intensity of the CSR reporting to stakeholders does not 
significantly influence CSRR in three of the four industries analysed in this paper (basic 
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industries, consumer goods and services industries). In some of these industries there are 
some effects of specific CSR reporting dimensions such as employees, customers, regulators 
and partners but these results are surely far from the expectations of managers in these 
industries. In the case of consumer goods and services industries, the results might be closely 
related to the low intensity of their CSR reporting. Regarding basic industries, the authors 
believe that companies are not correctly focusing their CSR reporting. For example, the 
results of the study by Holder-Webb et al. (2009) demonstrate that, in the context of regaining 
legitimacy, the only significant area of focus for the basic industries is in the category of 
environmental issues. However, this is not the case in Spain, where the CSR reporting to the 
community (including environmental information) is not the largest. Companies report 
significantly more information towards other stakeholders such as employees. At the same 
time, no significant differences exist in the CSR reporting to the community between the 
basic and the rest of industries. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE LINES OF RESEARCH  
 
In this paper the authors describe the CSR reporting practices of companies in Spain and 
establish the relationship that exists between this CSR reporting to stakeholders and their 
reputation for CSR. The results demonstrate that the CSR reporting is especially relevant and 
useful in the finance industry, which has recently been accused of being the main culprit in 
the current economic recession (de los Ríos et al., 2012; Rodríguez et al., 2013). Even when it 
is true that the finance industry does not have a significantly better reputation than other 
industries in Spain, the results of the paper suggest that if finance companies did not report as 
much and varied CSR information as they do, their reputation would be noticeably lower than 
it is. The economic crisis has seriously affected this industry and the fact that the CSR 
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reporting to stakeholders is positively influencing their reputation implies that less 
communication would have detrimental effects in their positioning and image. These results 
are highly interesting for managers in the finance industry because they justify the usefulness 
and adequacy of the CSR reporting that is being implemented in this context. Some 
implications are also relevant for the rest of industries in Spain because interesting insights 
are provided regarding how companies can improve their CSR reporting and its impact on 
corporate reputations. 
 
Anyhow, this study is not without limitations. First, scholars have recently confirmed that 
there is a problem of endogeneity in the relationship between the CSR reporting and 
reputation, which has not been tested in this paper. The relationship is bidirectional in such a 
way that not only the CSR reporting influences how the society perceives corporate reputation 
but also this perception determines the initiatives undertaken and communicated by 
companies in the CSR domain (Michelon 2011). This limitation could have been addressed in 
this paper by introducing some Granger causality tests (Hiemstra et al. 1994) at the level of 
the independent variables of the equations (1) and (2) on the one hand and CSRR on the other. 
Nonetheless, the Granger test requires that the authors regressed the dependent variable 
(CSRR in this paper) on its own lagged values and on lagged values of the independent 
variables (CSR reporting). In the case of the present research, the authors could not apply 
these tests because, for the dependent and independent variables, they only had information 
for one specific year (the 2013 MercoEmpresas Responsables index of CSRR and the 2011 
evaluation of CSR reporting). Based on these ideas, it is proposed that future scholars devote 
attention to the direction of the relationship between the CSR reporting and reputation in 
order to develop models that could further the academic knowledge about the CSR-reputation 
link. Furthermore, the authors choose a categorization of the CSR reporting which only 
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considers general CSR items. The purpose is to have a measurement tool that could be applied 
to the analysis of diverse industries. Nevertheless, the authors consider that future scholars 
who are interested in deepening in the study of a single industry might need to develop 
specific issues to add to this categorization in order to grasp the whole meaning of the CSR 
reporting in each industry. For example, microfinance is especially relevant in the banking 
industry and new items could be considered by those scholars interested in evaluating the 
CSR reporting. Finally, the quality of the information provided is also relevant (Piechocki 
2004; de los Ríos et al. 2012). Future lines of research should provide more sophisticated 
ways of evaluating the CSR reporting to stakeholders by also taking into account the quality 
of the CSR reporting.  
 
8. NOTES 
 
i  Scholars have traditionally linked the CSR reporting to stakeholders and reputation based on five streams of 
research: the institutional/legitimacy theory (Patten 1992; Deegan 2002), signalling theory (Spence 1974), 
impression management theory (Hoogheimstra 2000), reputation risk management theory (Bebbington et al. 
2008) and agency theory (Fama 1980). 
 
ii  Basic industries: chemicals, building and construction materials, forestry, paper and steel companies. 
Consumer goods: automobile and parts, clothing and footwear, textiles, households and appliances, 
furnishing and floor coverings, beverage companies, food processor and farming, health maintenance 
organizations, hospital management, medical equipment, household products, personal products, 
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and tobacco. 
Finance: banking services, insurance. 
Services: retailers, leisure and entertainment, media and photography, support services, transport, food and 
drug retailers, telecom fixed line, telecom wireless. 
 
iii  For the purpose of simplifying the interpretation of the results, all the indices which are discussed in the 
findings section are converted to a 0-1 scale. 
 
iv  Ir = {[(F0/N) – (1/k)] [k/(k-1)]}.05 where N = the total number of judgments made by each judge; F0 = the 
number of judgments on which the judges agree; and k = number of different ways in which each judge can 
code an observation. 
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10. APPENDIX 
 
Insert Table 7 here. 
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TABLE 1. Sample profile 
Industries Sample Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
      Basic industries      
Age 21 53.90 31.46 5 111 
Size (number of employees) 21 30,566 41,138 378 164,923 
Financial performance (ROA) 21 3.26 3.49 -2.53 11.69 
Risk (Debt ratio) 21 75.70 11.74 55.77 94.15 
      
Consumer goods      
Age 26 44.12 24.60 20 103 
Size (number of employees) 26 5,963 19,412 64 100,138 
Financial performance (ROA) 26 11.68 12.72 0.58 49.37 
Risk (Debt ratio) 26 67.04 17.20 34.63 96.11 
      
      
Finance      
Age 13 49.69 39.26 9 131 
Size (number of employees) 13 22,886 51,542 107 190,604 
Financial performance (ROA) 13 1.13 1.24 0.12 3.77 
Risk (Debt ratio) 13 86.99 15.85 37.36 99.73 
      
Services      
Age 24 34.54 24.37 3 102 
Size (number of employees) 24 30,352 59,449 131 286,144 
Financial performance (ROA) 24 4.49 7.77 
-
13.26 
22.58 
Risk (Debt ratio) 24 69.23 17.57 29.03 97.28 
 
 
TABLE 2. CSRR scores 
Industries Mean S.D. Min. Max. F-statistic 
Basic industries  0.46 0.16 0.30 0.91 
0.88 
Consumer goods  0.40 0.15 0.30 1.00 
Finance  0.48 0.15 0.31 0.82 
Services  0.44 0.15 0.30 0.98 
 
 
TABLE 3. Intensity of the CSR reporting to stakeholders 
Industries Mean S.D. 
Min. Max. F-
statistic 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Basic 
industries 
0.48 0.18 0.19 0.77 
5.48*** 
- 0.78* -0.43 0.68* 
Consumer 
goods 
0.38 0.11 0.11 0.60  - -
1.20*** 
-0.09 
Finance 0.53 0.09 0.33 0.67   - 1.11** 
Services 0.39 0.12 0.15 0.61    - 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively 
 3 
(1) Basic industries; (2) consumer goods; (3) finance; (4) services 
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TABLE 4. Orientation of the CSR reporting to stakeholders 
Industries Mean S.D. F-statistic (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        Employees:        
Basic industries 0.67 0.24 
4.00*** 
- 0.04 -0.12* 0.10 
Consumer goods 0.63 0.16 - - -0.16* 0.06 
Finance 0.78 0.12 - - - 0.22*** 
Services 0.57 0.19 - - - - 
        Customers:        
Basic industries 0.42 0.22 
1.28 
- - - - 
Consumer goods 0.38 0.20 - - - - 
Finance 0.52 0.17 - - - - 
Services 0.41 0.23 - - - - 
        Investors:        
Basic industries 0.29 0.22 
7.17*** 
- 0.20** -0.04 0.22*** 
Consumer goods 0.08 0.23 - - -0.24*** 0.02 
Finance 0.32 0.28 - - - 0.26*** 
Services 0.07 0.15 - - - - 
    - - -  Partners:        
Basic industries 0.30 0.24 
0.48 
- - - - 
Consumer goods 0.26 0.19 - - - - 
Finance 0.26 0.19 - - - - 
Services 0.23 0.15 - - - - 
        Community:        
Basic industries 0.63 0.20 
1.68 
- - - - 
Consumer goods 0.58 0.14 - - - - 
Finance 0.67 0.10 - - - - 
Services 0.58 0.20 - - - - 
        Regulators:        
Basic industries 0.39 0.30 3.07** - 0.12 -0.09 0.15 
Consumer goods 0.27 0.27  - - 0.21 -0.03 
Finance 0.48 0.22  - - - 0.24* 
Services 0.24 0.26  - - - - 
        Activists:        
Basic industries 0.67 0.33 
2.05 
- - - - 
Consumer goods 0.73 0.32 - - - - 
Finance 0.92 0.19 - - - - 
Services 0.73 0.29 - - - - 
        Media:        
Basic industries 0.48 0.43 
3.55** 
- 0.32** 0.17 0.14 
Consumer goods 0.15 0.24 - - -0.15 -0.18 
Finance 0.31 0.25 - - - -0.03 
Services 0.33 0.38 - - - - 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively 
(1) Basic industries; (2) consumer goods; (3) finance; (4) services 
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TABLE 5. Regression results: Specification I 
Variables Coefficients 
CSR reporting:  
† Basic industries 0.05 
† Consumer goods 0.02 
† Finance 0.07** 
† Services 0.02 
Age -0.13 
Size 0.05** 
ROA 0.45 
Risk -0.39** 
Constant 8.01*** 
R2 0.28 
Wald’s test 3.60*** 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively 
† indicates linear restriction tests for interactions between CSR reporting and each industrial dummy 
 
 
TABLE 6. Regression results: Specification II  
Variables Coefficients Variables Coefficients 
Employees:  Regulators:  
†† Basic industries -0.08 †† Basic industries 0.39 
†† Consumer goods 0.13 †† Consumer goods -0.06 
†† Finance 0.66 †† Finance 0.09 
†† Services 0.94* †† Services -0.82*** 
Customers:  Activists:  
†† Basic industries 0.14 †† Basic industries 0.01 
†† Consumer goods -0.43* †† Consumer goods 0.17 
†† Finance -1.04** †† Finance 0.58*** 
†† Services -0.20 †† Services -0.08 
Investors:  Media:  
†† Basic industries -0.03 †† Basic industries -0.19 
†† Consumer goods 0.37 †† Consumer goods 0.11 
†† Finance 0.58*** †† Finance -0.78* 
†† Services 0.42 †† Services -0.16 
Partners:  Age 0.12 
††Basic industries 0.83** Size 0.07*** 
†† Consumer goods -0.23 ROA 0.31 
†† Finance 0.52 Risk -0.14 
†† Services -0.16 Constant 7.77*** 
Community:  R2 0.66 
†† Basic industries -0.42 Wald’s test 6.49*** 
†† Consumer goods 0.05   
†† Finance -0.68   
†† Services -0.20   
*, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively 
†† indicates linear restriction tests for interactions between CSR reporting dimensions and each industrial 
dummy 
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TABLE 7. CSR reporting items and dimensions 
CSR reporting Items 
Employees 
1. Training and development 
2. Health and safety 
3. Equal opportunities 
4. Diversity 
5. Reconciliation of work and family life 
6. Social benefits (good retirement benefits, profit sharing, and participation in the property 
of the company, among others) 
7. Freedom of association, collective bargaining and complaint procedures 
8. Formal representation in decision-making 
9. Employee relations, communication and dialogue mechanisms 
10. Regular evaluation of employee satisfaction 
11. Policy of remuneration, compensation and rewards 
12. Job creation and stability 
Customers 
1. Competitive prices and payment conditions 
2. High product quality 
3. High innovation and accessibility 
4. Product health and safety 
5. Development of products to meet the special needs of the disadvantaged 
6. Confidentiality 
7. Standards and voluntary codes for advertising and marketing practices 
8. Transparency in advertising and marketing practices 
9. Customer relations, communication and dialogue mechanisms 
10. Regular evaluation of customer satisfaction 
11. CSR initiatives in collaboration with customers 
Investors 
1. Shareholder rights 
2. Formal representation in decision-making 
3. Investor relations, communication and dialogue mechanisms 
4. Regulatory mechanisms for prohibiting insider trading 
5. Rules to strengthen auditor independence 
6.Provision of all required information to credit rating agencies 
Partners 
1. Policy to ensure ethical and friendly procurement at partner facilities 
2. Policy on restrictions on the use of child labour, sweat shop and violation of human rights 
at partner facilities 
3. Inspection of partners facilities for health, safety and environmental aspects 
4. Policy for social accountability or sustainable reporting by partners 
6. Equal opportunities when establishing alliances 
7. Policy to pay and receive competitive market prices timely to/from partners 
8. CSR initiatives in collaboration with partners 
Community 
1. Environmental policy, systems and performance 
2. Social and charitable contribution 
3. Educational and cultural contribution 
4. Economic development programs 
5. Human rights 
6. Contribution to future generations 
7. Having a foundation 
8. Consultation with community leaders to know about emerging issues 
Regulators 
1. Payment of taxes on a regular and continuing basis 
2. Compliance with local laws and regulations 
3. Bribery and whistle-blowing programs 
4. Description of policies to political lobbying and contributions 
Activists 
1. Employment volunteer activities and donation programs 
2. Partnerships with nongovernmental and community organizations, government agencies 
and other industry groups dedicated to CSR causes 
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Media 
1. Regular publication of financial and non-financial information 
2. Management of relationships with the media 
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FIGURE 1. Orientation of the CSR reporting to stakeholders 
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